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PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND CHOICE 
OF LAW 
James Martin* 
The time has come for the Supreme Court to declare that a state 
may not apply its own law to a case unless it has the "minimum 
contacts" required by International Shoe1 for the exercise of specific2 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Although the present state 
of the law is less than certain, 3 the Supreme Court has not yet re-
quired that a state show it has minimum contacts with a defendant 
before applying its law. As a result, in some cases where a state has 
obtained personal jurisdiction because of a defendant's contacts un-
related to the case - contacts such as transaction of substantial but 
unrelated business within the state, or incorporation or domicile 
within the state - the state may apply its own law even when in 
conflict with the law of a state that has much greater contact with 
both the defendant and the events giving rise to the case.4 The situa-
tion fairly cries out for a standard for the application of forum law 
on a basis that does not depend upon the vagaries of the defendant's 
unrelated activities. With recent attention refocusing upon constitu-
tional limitations on jurisdiction and choice of law, 5 the time is ripe 
for examination of a "minimum contacts" limitation on choice of 
law. The potential rewards include greater fairness to litigants, 
healthier federalism, and improvements in judicial administration. 
The basic standard for in personam jurisdiction, despite recent 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1965, University of Illinois; M.S. 1966, 
J.D. 1969, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
1. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). "Minimum contacts" is 
used here to indicate contacts related to the substance of the case. Thus a state's substantial 
but umelated contacts would not justify application of its law under this proposal. 
2. The term "specific" jurisdiction is used in the sense of von Mehren & Trautman, Juris-
diction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 19 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1145 (1966), to indicate 
jurisdiction of the type involved in International Shoe - based upon minimum contacts re• 
lated to the plaintiffs claim and supporting only litigation related to those contacts. 
3. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 225 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
("[C]onstitutional limitations on the choice of law are by no means settled"). 
4. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., - Minn.-, 289 N.W.2d 43 (1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 
1012 (1980), is just such a case. 
5. See Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S .. Ct. 571 (1980) (jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980) (jurisdiction); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 
(1978) (jurisdiction); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (jurisdiction); Hague v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., - Minn.-, 289 N.W.2d 43 (1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980) (choice of 
law). 
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elaboration., is still found in International Shoe Co. v. Washington: a 
state may not exercise in personamjurisdiction unless to do so would 
be consistent with "fair play and substantial justice" and unless there 
are either "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the fo-
rum state out of which the plaintiffs claim arises (specific personal 
jurisdiction), or there are substantial contacts, not necessarily related 
to the case, 6 between the defendant and the state. There is no clear 
corresponding formula for constitutional limitations on the state's 
right to apply its own law to a case, but some kind of "contact" is a 
precondition of the state's right to apply its own law, and the 
Supreme Court has indicated that some contacts that may suffice for 
choice-of-law purposes do not suffice for jurisdiction purposes.7 Pro-
fessor Willis Reese has recently suggested that the "same basic prin-
ciples" underlie jurisdiction and choice-of-law issues, but he stops 
short of suggesting a minimum contacts test for constitutional limita-
tions on choice of law.8 
I suggest that the Supreme Court take that further step. When a 
state obtains jurisdiction over the defendant through substantial con-
tacts unrelated to the case, courts should ask whether jurisdiction 
could have been upheld absent those substantial unrelated contacts. 
In other words, are there "minimum contacts" between the state and 
the defendant? If there are not, the forum state should not be al-
lowed to apply its own law to the case. 
I. 
The differing standards for choice of law and jurisdiction seem to 
be an accident of history. Both standards create constitutional limi-
tations on state judicial action, rather than provide prescriptive rules 
for that action. The sources of the constitutional limitations for the 
6. Unrelated contacts sufficient to support in personamjurisdiction include the defendant's 
domicile, incorporation, or transaction of business in the state. Regarding substantial unre-
lated contacts between the defendant and the forum, International Shoe says: 
While it has been held, in cases on which appellant relies, that continuous activity of 
some sort within a state is not enough to support the demand that [a] corporation be 
amenable to suits unrelated to that activity • . . there have been instances in which the 
continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a 
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct 
from those activities. 
326 U.S. at 318. 
7. For example, the contacts with Louisiana considered by the Supreme Court in Watson 
v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), included the fact that the plaintiff was 
a resident of Louisiana. These interests were used to support application qf Louisiana law, 
even though the plaintiff's residence is generally held to be irrelevant to the forum's jurisdic-
tion. But cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966) (Alabama court 
declined jurisdiction in part because plaintiff was not Alabama resident). 
8. See Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1592 (1978). 
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two areas - the full faith and credit clause and the due process 
clause - do not by their own terms demand any particular stan-
dards. Unfortunately, standards for "legislative jurisdiction"9 (con-
stitutional limitations on choice of law) and 'Judicial jurisdiction" 
(constitutional limitations on jurisdiction) were developed before the 
close relation between choice of law and jurisdiction was appreci-
ated.10 Development of modem standards began in an era in which 
it was acknowledged that more than one state could have jurisdiction 
over a case but it was believed that only one state's law could prop-
erly apply to the case. I I 
The chief difference between the contacts needed to impose judi-
cial jurisdiction and those needed to impose legislative jurisdiction 
seems to lie in the question: contacts with what or whom? In the 
area of judicial jurisdiction it is clear that contacts between the de-
fendant and the forum occupy center stage. 12 Not so clear is the role, 
if any, played by contacts between the forum and the factual ele-
ments of the case13 (such as the physical location of an accident, the 
place of contract execution, etc.). The Supreme Court discussed fo-
rum-plaintiff and forum-case contacts, which may be equated with 
the interests of the forum in asserting jurisdiction, 14 in cases prior to 
International Shoe. 15 And in McGee v. International L!fe Insurance 
9. There is some objection in the literature to the phrase "legislative jurisdiction" because 
of its association with the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws. See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIO, 
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 4 (1962). The phrase is used here because the idea is 
referred to frequently and "legislative jurisdiction" bears frequent repetition more readily than 
"constitutional limitations on choice of law." 
10. For a discussion of jurisdiction and choice of law, and the relationship of the two to 
full faith and credit and due process, see Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 
61 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 201-03 (1976). 
11. Under the first Restatement of Conflicts of Laws, for example, the rules always led to 
the law of a single jurisdiction. 
12. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980), 
13. The term "factual elements of the case" will be used hereafter to indicate aspects of the 
case excluding the domicile, incorporation, business activities, etc., of the plaintiff and the 
defendant. Thus, for example, the chief factual element of any tort case will be the location of 
the tort. The chief factual elements of a contract case will be the location of the negotiation, 
execution, performance, and breach of the contract. 
14. Discussion of forum-plaintiff and forum-case contacts may be equated with concern 
for the interests of the forum because legitimate forum interests would seem to have to relate to 
the well-being of people or things within the forum. Since such an interest will not be an 
interest in the well-being of a foreign defendant with only minimum contacts with the forum, it 
must be based upon contacts with the plaintiff or with the factual elements of the case. Thus, 
whatever importance is attached to the forum's interest in jurisdiction cases is based ultimately 
on contacts between the forum and the plaintiff or between the forum and the factual elements 
of the case. And, since there is no obvious importance to these two kinds of contacts other 
than as support for the forum's interest, discussion of them may fairly be equated with discus-
sion of forum interests. 
15. E.g., Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Hess v. Pawlowski, 
274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
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Co., 16 decided after International Shoe, the Court referred to the 
"manifest" interest of California in regulating insurance, as evi-
denced by special legislation on the subject, in allowing the state to 
exercise jurisdiction.17 The recent cases, however, seem to have 
abandoned the "interests" theme. In Kulko v. Superior Court, 18 the 
Supreme Court specifically held that the interest of California in the 
well-being of resident children affected by a foreign divorce proceed-
ing was insufficient to support jurisdiction in child support proceed-
ings, 19 despite the sufficiency of the same state's interest in insurance 
regulation in McGee. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son,20 Oklahoma's interest in redressing a wrong that occurred 
within its borders was simply ignored as a possible basis for jurisdic-
tion. And although Sho/.fer v. Heitner21 seemed to echo McGee when 
it said that special legislation claiming jurisdiction under the facts of 
the case might have tipped the scales in favor of Delaware's jurisdic-
tion,22 the reference was aimed at the issue of notice, rather than at 
the state's interest. 
These cases imply a current view that state interests are simply 
insufficient to support judicial jurisdiction if minimum contacts with 
the defendant are absent.23 Because jurisdiction is available on the 
basis of minimum contacts alone, the fact that forum interests are 
insufficient without minimum contacts means in effect that forum 
interests are simply irrelevant. In other words, contacts between the 
forum and the plaintiff or between the forum and the factual ele-
16. 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (Texas company, which insured California resident by mail, held 
subject to California's jurisdiction when sued on policy, even though company did no other 
business in California). 
17. 355 U.S. at 223. 
18. 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (ex-wife, California resident, brought suit in California against ex-
husband, New York resident, to modify terms of Haitian divorce, where defendant's only rela-
tion to California was residency of ex-wife and children). 
19. 436 U.S. at 98. 
20. 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980) (Oklahoma jurisdiction over defendant New York auto dealer 
denied when former New York residents were injured in Oklahoma while driving car 
purchased from defendant). 
21. 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (in stockholder's derivative suit, Delaware sequestration of stock 
owned by defendant officers of Delaware corporation held insufficient basis for jurisdiction 
absent minimum contacts between defendants and Delaware). 
22. 433 U.S. at 216. But see 433 U.S. at 220 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
23. It is true, of course, that in each of these last three cases jurisdiction was denied. Thus 
a lack of detailed discussion of a factor like forum interest that might uphold jurisdiction 
might not be surprising if the opinions are viewed as advocacy rather than explanation. The 
opinions are not particularly argumentative, however, and their varying treatment of or silence 
on forum interests thus seems to imply the view that state interests are simply insufficient if 
minimum contacts are not also present. 
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ments of the case are no longer a part of the jurisprudence of state 
court jurisdiction. 
In contrast, contacts between the forum and the plaintiff or be-
tween the forum and the factual elements of the case have had a 
prominent place in the analysis of choice oflaw cases. It is probably 
safe to say that the ."modem" era of constitutional restrictions on 
choice oflaw began with Home Insurance Co. v . .Dick. 24 .Dick estab-
lished that a plaintiff's domicile is insufficient by itself for imposition 
of the forum's law.25 Although the forum's interest did not prevail in 
.Dick, Justice Black's discussion of the choice-of-law issues in the 
subsequent case of Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. 26 
relies heavily on the forum state's interest in providing remedies for 
those injured within its borders to justify application of the forum's 
law.27 Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd,28 the only subsequent 
Supreme Court decision that discusses constitutional limits on choice 
of law, avoided discussion of interests and turned directly to con-
tacts. Justice Douglas's opinion, quoting Justice Black's language 
from an earlier phase of the case,29 gave equal prominence to con-
tacts between the forum and the defendant and contacts between the 
forum and the plaintiff or the factual elements of the case. The legis-
lative jurisdiction cases have thus conceded an importance to forum-
plaintiff or forum-case contacts that the judicial jurisdiction cases 
have reserved to forum-defendant contacts. 
Although the affirmative reasons for adopting a minimum con-
tacts standard for legislative jurisdiction30 are discussed at length be-
24. 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (application of Texas law prohibiting limitations period shorter 
than two years for filing insurance claims to contract made in Mexico between plaintiff, domi-
ciled in Texas but residing in Mexico, and Mexican company held violation of due process). 
25. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 182 (1964), does not hold to the contrary 
since the insured-against loss occurred within the forum in Clay. See text following note 58 
infra. 
26. 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (Louisiana direct-action statute held to apply, in an action based 
upon a Louisiana injury, to insurance contract made outside Louisiana by insured and insurer 
whose chief places of business were outside Louisiana, which contained clause forbidding di-
rect actions). 
27. 348 U.S. at 72-73. 
28. 377 U.S. 179 (1964) (Florida law prohibiting limitations period shorter than five years 
for filing insurance claims held to apply to contract made in Illinois between Illinois resident 
who moved to Florida, where injury occurred, and British company doing business in both 
states). 
29. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 221 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting), quoted al 
377 U.S. at 182. 
30. In proposing a "minimum contacts" test I do not intend to foreclose the possibility that 
a state may have minimum contacts with one aspect of a case and yet not with another, and 
that it may therefore apply its own law only to the related aspect of the case. For example, a 
state may have the right to apply its own law to determine the validity of the marriage between 
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low,31 it is appropriate to emphasize that even though the differences 
between the standards for legislative and judicial jurisdiction are sig-
nificant, adoption of a minimum contacts test for legislative jurisdic-
tion would have surprisingly little unsettling effect on the law in its 
present state of development by the Supreme Court. Even though 
the Supreme Court has not expressly applied a minimum contacts 
standard in earlier cases, no coherent alternative theory oflegislative 
jurisdiction would have to be rejected if minimum contacts is 
adopted. The cases are simply too few and speak in too many 
tongues to be able to state, with any confidence, that there is an ar-
ticulable approach that minimum contacts would displace. The re-
markable diversity of formulas produced by some of the best minds 
in this field, as well as by this author, testifies to the difficulty in 
formulating the rationale of the earlier cases.32 Perhaps more impor-
tant in ensuring a smooth shift to a minimum contacts standard, few 
if any of the earlier Supreme Court cases would require a different 
result under the new standard, and hence the Court need not neces-
sarily overrule any cases to adopt a minimum contacts test for limita-
tions on choice of law. 
The latter conclusion follows from a close examination of the two 
sources or statements asserting that legislative jurisdiction standards 
differ from the minimum contacts standard: cases considering judi-
cial jurisdiction and cases considering choice of law. In the judicial 
jurisdiction cases33 the statements have generally been similar to that 
in Ku!ko v. Superior Court:34 "But while the presence of the children 
and one parent in California arguably might favor application of 
California law in a lawsuit in New York, the fact that California 
may be the 'cen!er of gravity' for choice-of-law purposes does not 
its domiciliaries but not necessarily to determine all the consequences of that marriage no 
matter where they occur. 
3 I. See text at notes 44-49 i'!fra. 
32. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 60, at 116 (3d ed. 1977); R. WEIN-
TRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 505 (2d ed. 1980); Kirgis, The Roles q/ Due 
Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice q/ Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94, 103-04 (1976); 
Overton, State Decisions in Co,!flict ef Laws and Review by the United States Supreme Court 
Under the Due Process Clause, 22 ORE. L. REV. 109, 170 (1943); Reese, supra note 8, at 1596-
97; Simson, State Autonomy in Choice ef Law: A Suggested Approach, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 61, 
87 (1978); Martin, supra note IO, at 211. 
33. E.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) ("But like Heitner's first argument, 
this line of reasoning establishes only that it is appropriate for Delaware law to govern the 
obligations of appellants .... It does not demonstrate [contacts] that would justify bringing 
them before a Delaware tribunal"); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,253 (1958) ("For choice-
of-law purposes such a ruling may be justified, but we think it an insubstantial connection with 
the trust agreement for purposes of determining the question of personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant"). 
34. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
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mean that California has personal jurisdiction over the defendant."35 
Two things should be noted about such statements. First, they usu-
ally do not assert that the forum's law could constitutionally have 
been applied, but rather only suggest that possibility. Second, such 
statements are not only dicta but obiter as well when considered as 
statements about choice of law, since their purpose is to make an 
assertion about jurisdiction rather than about choice of law. 
Statements about standards for legislative jurisdiction found in 
the choice-of-law cases themselves require closer inspection. Since 
Home Insurance v. Dick36 marks the beginning of the modem era of 
constitutional limitations on choice of law, the inspection of the case 
law for legislative jurisdiction standards requiring less than mini-
mum contacts between the forum and the defendant can be restricted 
to cases starting with Dick. Moreover, the inspection can be further 
limited to cases in which the forum's application of its own law was 
upheld: all other cases are either cases like Dick, where contacts 
were insufficient both for specific in personam jurisdiction and for 
choice of law, or cases like Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper31 
and Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wo!fe,38 whose hold-
ings are of doubtful current validity, raise peculiar full faith and 
credit problems, and have been disapproved or limited to their par-
ticular facts.39 Among the cases upholding choice of forum law, a 
majority may be dealt with by the observation that, whatever the 
expressed rationale of the case, the contacts were sufficient to support 
not only application of the forum's law but also assertion of its juris-
diction.40 Only two really troublesome cases remain: Watson v. Em-
35. 436 U.S. at 98. 
36. 281 U.S. 397 (1930). 
37. 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (Vermont resident employed by Vermont company injured while 
temporarily performing duties in New Hampshire; federal court in New Hampshire held 
bound to apply Vermont compensation law which provided that Vermont compensation law 
would apply to out-of-state activities performed under employment contracts made in Ver-
mont). 
38. 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (South Dakota court required to give full faith and credit to Ohio 
law permitting six-month contractual limit on suit for denial of insurance benefits, when Ohio 
assignee of claim of South Dakota fraternal benefit society member sued the Ohio fraternal 
benefit society). 
39. In Carrol v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412 (1955), Justice Douglas indicated that Pacific 
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Cornmn., 306 U.S. 493 (1939), had "departed" from 
Clapper. The plurality opinion in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 4930, 
4934 n.18 (U.S. June 27, 1980) (No. 79-116), said "Carroll . .• for all intents and purposes 
buried whatever was left of Clapper after Pac!fic Employers . ... " Wolfe is questioned in R. 
LEFLAR, supra note 32, § 58, at 113-14, and R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 32, at 526-30. 
40. E.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 306 U.S. 493 (1939) 
(accident giving rise to liability occurred within the forum state); Alaska Packers Assn. v. In-
dustrial Accident Comrnn., 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (contract of employment entered into in forum 
state though work-related accident took place elsewhere). 
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ployers Liability Assurance Corp. 41 and Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, 
Ltd 42 And as the final section of this Article will show, an applica-
tion of a minimum contacts choice-of-law standard to the facts of 
Watson and Clay might arguably produce the same results the 
Supreme Court reached in those cases.43 The transition to a mini-
mum contacts standard for legislative jurisdiction could therefore be 
quite smooth. 
II. 
The benefits of a new minimum contacts standard for legislative 
jurisdiction are considerable. The minimum contacts approach to 
choice of law prevents the unfairness to defendants that is possible 
under present law, promotes healthier interstate relations, and is rel-
atively easy for judges to apply. 
Although legislative jurisidiction cases for the most part speak in 
terms of power rather than fairness,44 the importance of fairness has 
always been apparent to observers, and many,45 though not all,46 of 
the various attempts at formulating choice-of-law limitations doc-
trine have included fairness as a criterion. From the defendant's 
perspective, the differing treatment of contacts in the jurisdiction and 
choice-of-law cases turns things on their head. In the typical juris-
dictiqn case, overreaching on the part of the forum state results at 
worst in inconvenience and greater expense for the defendant.47 In 
the typical conflicts case, however, overreaching on the part of the 
forum will change the results of the case: if the plaintiff has· chosen 
his forum wisely, the defendant will lose a case he would otherwise 
41. 348 U.S. 66 (1954). 
42. 377 U.S. 179 (1964). 
43. See text at notes 53-64 i,!fra. 
44. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930) ("Texas was, therefore, 
without power to affect the terms of contracts so made"); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur-
ance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 71 (1954) (discussion of Dick in terms of "power"). 
45. E.g., R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 32, at 505; Overton, supra note 32, at 170; Reese, 
supra note 8, at 1596-97; Kirgis, supra note 32, at 103-04. 
46. Professor Lefiar's test speaks in terms of "substantial connection." R. LEFLAR, supra 
note 32, § 60, at I 16. Professor Gary Simson has advocated a system that obligates reference 
to the law of the state or states "most interested in influencing the outcome of the case," Sim-
son, supra note 32, at 87. My own proposed test makes no reference to fairness. Martin, supra 
note 10, at 211. 
47. It is true, of course, that the nonavailability of compulsory process or the expense of 
transporting witnesses may result in a party presenting a less persuasive case, leading to a loss 
where there otherwise would have been a victory. But this will be the rare case. Witnesses are 
generally available if their expenses are paid, making the question once more one of finances. 
Depositions can remove a substantial part of the problem when witnesses are not likely to be a 
major factor in deciding whether or not to call them in "big cases." 
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have won, simply because the forum has asserted its legislative au-
thority. 
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is supposed 
to protect the defendant from fundamental unfairness. Thus from 
the defendant's perspective, it seems irrational to say that due pro-
cess requires minimum contacts with the forum state merely to hale 
him into the forum's court while allowing more tenuous contacts to 
upset the very outcome of the case. Simple fairness seems to de-
mand that when the forum's intrusion is much more destructive of 
his interests, as when it applies its own law, the forum be held to at 
least as high a standard as is exacted in the jurisdiction cases.48 
The argument might be reversed, however, if the matter is 
viewed from the perspective of the forum. There are few advantages 
to the forum that flow directly from trying cases with which it has 
only marginal contacts, and there are obviously costs in entertaining 
such litigation. On the other hand, the forum sees clear advantages, 
in terms of effectuating its policies, in applying its own law to a case. 
Thus while the defendant's view of things might seem to lead logi-
cally to the requirement of equal or greater contacts for asserting 
legislative jurisdiction than for asserting judicial jurisdiction, empha-
sis on the interests of the forum suggests that less contact should be 
needed to justify imposition of its law. 
For several reasons, the forum's perspective should not be the 
controlling one. First, although this view promotes the interests of 
the forum in advancing its own policies as reflected in its laws, such 
has not been the historical basis for the distinction between judicial 
and legislative jurisdiction. While the results of the judicial jurisdic-
tion and choice-of-law cases discussed above could be explained in 
terms of fairness to the forum, the cases simply have not done so. 
Second, the greater implementation of forum policies achieved 
48. I do not here deal with the problem of the forum's right to impose its own law on the 
plaintiff, based upon the plaintiff's domicile or a combination of the plaintiff's and the defend-
ant's domicile. Such cases arise in the context, for example, of Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 
473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), where the plaintiff and the defendant were 
domiciled in New York but the accident in question took place in Ontario. New York applied 
its own law rather than the Ontario guest statute. Since there were contacts with New York 
other than the domicile of the parties, Babcock itself presents no significant constitutional 
problems. But several variations can be imagined on a case in which an accident takes place in 
State A, the forum is State B, and the only contacts between the forum and the parties are 
party domiciles: (I) the plaintiff was domiciled in State B but the defendant was not (the J)ick 
case); (2) neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was domiciled in State B at the time of the 
accident but the plaintiff thereafter acquires a domicile there (the Hague case discussed in text 
·at notes 65-68 i'!fra); (3) the plaintiff was domiciled in State B at the time of the accident and 
the defendant thereafter becomes domiciled there; and (4) both parties acquired domicile in 
State B after the accident. 
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by the forum under the more relaxed contact requirements in choice-
of-law cases is entirely haphazard. The forum's interests are effectu-
ated under such a standard only when factors unrelated to the merits 
of the case or the interests of the forum provide it with general in 
personam jurisdiction: when, for example, the defendant is a corpo-
ration that fortuitously happens to be carrying on business in the 
forum unrelated to the plaintifrs claim. In all other cases -where 
the forum exercises jurisdiction based on minimum contacts or on 
substantial contacts related to the cause of action - the minimum 
contacts choice-of-law requirement suggested by this Article would 
be satisfied. Consideration of the forum's interest therefore further 
extends the forum's policies only in cases where the defendant is un-
fortunate enough to have substantial contacts with the forum that 
are unrelated to the case. This haphazard application of the forum's 
law is unfair to the defendant and of erratic benefit to the forum. 
A final and important argument against the perspective of the 
forum state- and in favor of the defendant's perspective that would 
require at least minimum contacts in choice-of-law cases - is that 
the balance that is being struck is not simply between the forum state 
and the defendant resisting the application of the forum's law. In 
any case in which the contacts with the forum state are less than 
"minimum contacts," the contacts with some other state must be 
much more substantial. Thus the balance is between the plaintiff 
and the forum state - whose contacts are slight - on one side and 
the defendant and the state whose law he invokes - whose contacts 
are substantial - on the other. 
The minimum contacts approach to legislative jurisdiction also 
h,;ls obvious benefits for interstate relations. The present system, 
whatever its exact bounds, allows a fair degree of grasping on the 
part of states that push application of their own laws to the limits. 
Resistance to any tighter limits on unseemly grasping is natural in 
light of the difficulty of devising a scheme of deciding which single 
state's law ought to apply. Witness the present inability of the states 
even to begin to agree on an approach to choice-of-law problems. 
Federalizing choice of law does not seem to be the answer to state 
overreaching. The alternative to a system of federal law requiring a 
particular choice of law is to provide for limitations on the states' 
choice of law. The minimum contacts approach here suggested is 
such a limitations approach, and has the advantage of providing 
more significant limitations than the present approach, thus tending 
to reduce overreaching. 
Finally, a minimum contacts choice-of-law limitation provides a 
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corollary benefit to judicial administration by replacing a confusing 
body of case law with a standard with which state courts are already 
familiar. Long-arm jurisdiction cases are relatively common in state 
courts, and judges could apply their experience with these cases to 
the legislative jurisdiction problem. The abundance of long-arm 
cases also provides a wealth of case law to fall back upon when a 
given court's own experience is not helpful. 
It would be less than open, however, to suggest that the adoption 
of a minimum contacts test would· solve all problems of legislative 
jurisdiction. Obviously the concept of minimum contacts itself is un-
dergoing a limited reinspection in light of the recent holding of the 
Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.49 
Moreover, there are certain areas in which minimum contacts does 
not seem to be the standard for either jurisdiction or choice of law. 
Most of these areas involve what could be described loosely as "sta-
tus" questions - marital status, legitimacy, spendthrift status, and 
the like. Even as early as Pennoyer v. Nejf,50 it was recognized that 
such issues are not subject to the ordinary rules of jurisdiction.51 
The fact that the courts of the plaintiffs domicile may assert jurisdic-
tion and apply their own law in divorce cases demonstrates that at 
least some status questions get special treatment in the conflicts area 
as well. Although courts could probably devise similar jurisdiction 
and choice-of-law standards for these areas where they are not al-
ready the same, more attention would have to be paid to the prob-
lem. 
In one respect, analysis of legislative jurisdiction would have to 
differ from analysis of judicial jurisdiction even if a minimum con-
tacts standard is adopted for both. It is usually held that long-arm 
jurisdiction statutes are not "substantive" for purposes of retroactiv-
ity and thus may be applied retroactively without constitutional diffi-
culty. For choice-of-law purposes, however, acquisition by a 
defendant of a new domicile after the operative events giving rise to 
the plaintiffs claim should not subject the case to the law of the af-
ter-acquired domicile. 
Finally, a minimum contacts approach to legislative jurisdiction 
49. 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980). 
50. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
51. To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this opinion, it is proper to 
observe that we do not mean to assert, by any thing we have said, that a State may not 
authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, 
which would be binding within the State, though made without service of process or per-
sonal notice to the non-resident. 
95 U.S. at 734. 
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would not resolve the difficult issue of when a state law is "procedu-
ral" for choice-of-law purposes. A forum state may always apply its 
own "procedural" law to a case no matter how minimal its contacts 
with the defendant.52 There is simply no analogous principle with 
respect to judicial jurisdiction, nor can there be - a state court either 
has jurisdiction or does not, and there is no possibility for treating 
procedural and substantive issues differently in this respect. Thus, 
the substance-procedure dichotomy will remain an issue in legisla-
tive jurisdiction cases, and the minimum contacts test will not assist 
in solving it. 
III. 
The analysis below applies the proposed minimum contacts stan-
dard to the facts of two cases already decided by the Supreme Court 
- Watson53 and Clay54 - and to the facts of a case soon to be re-
viewed by the Court - Hague v. Allstate Insurance Corp. 55 The 
analysis indicates that, while application of the forum state's law 
might be justifiable in Watson and Clay, the forum state in Hague 
lacked the minimum contacts necessary to apply its law. 
The issue in Watson was whether or not Louisiana could impose 
its direct action statute in the case of an insurance contract entered 
into outside Louisiana by an insured and insurer whose chief places 
of business were outside Louisiana. The contract contained a clause 
forbidding direct actions. The insured/tortfeasor sold products in 
Louisiana, one of which, a Toni home permanent, injured a Louisi-
ana resident. Jurisdiction over the insurance company was based 
upon the transaction of a substantial amount of business in the state 
unrelated to the insured's contract or the tort. The Supreme Court 
allowed Louisiana to apply its direct action statute. To decide 
whether or not the minim11m contacts standard would yield the same 
result, we must ask whether jurisdiction over the insurance company 
could have been upheld if the insurance company had not been 
52. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 122 (1971). The classifica-
tion of a matter as substantive or procedural for choice-of-law purposes differs from the same 
classification made for Erie purposes, as illustrated in Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940), where the federal court had to determine which party 
had the burden of proof with respect to contributory negligence. The court decided, under 
Erie, that the matter was "substantive" and that state law should govern. But under the law of 
the state where the court was sitting, the issue was considered procedural for choice-of-law 
purposes, calling for application of the law of the forum rather than the law of the state where 
the accident occurred. 
53. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). 
54. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964). 
55. - Minn.-, 289 N.W.2d 43 (1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980). 
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transacting the unrelated business in Louisiana. In other words, 
were there minimum contacts between the state and the insurer? I 
suggest the facts in Watson satisfy the minimum contacts standards. 
It has been widely assumed that insuring risks within the state would 
subject one to jurisdiction in cases involving the insurance. The 
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, for example, 
provides that "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a per-
son, who acts directly or by agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for 
relief] arising from the person's . . . contracting to insure any per-
son, property, or risk located within this state at the time of con-
tracting."56 Since harm caused by the tortfeasor's products was the 
risk insured against, and since the tortfeasor had an established dis-
tribution of products in Louisiana, the insurance company in Wat-
son would apparently satisfy the requirement of the Act. Assuming 
that the Uniform Act is constitutional, the result in Watson is there-
fore consistent with a minimum contacts approach to choice-of-law 
limitations. 
Even if the facts of Watson do not satisfy a minimum contacts 
standard, they take the case within the "procedure" exception dis-
cussed above, and thus outside the scope of constitutional limitations 
on choice oflaw, including a limitation based on minimum contacts. 
Although a direct action statute is formally "substantive" insofar as 
it creates a cause of action that did not previously exist against an 
insurance company, the reality of the matter is that the company will 
eventually suffer the same result if its insured is required to suffer a 
judgment before the insurer is liable.57 The direct action statute sim-
ply hastens that result by collapsing two potential lawsuits into one. 
If there is any truly substantive impact of the direct action, it arises 
from the fear that the jury's knowledge that an insurer is involved 
will increase the likelihood of a plaintifrs verdict or increase the size 
of the plaintiff's verdict. This is a legitimate business concern on the 
part of insurance companies, but surely it is within the power of the 
forum to di.ff er with the conclusion that such fears are well-
grounded, 58 or to provide alternative procedural safeguards against 
such results in the form of appropriate cautionary jury instructions 
56. UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT§ 103(a). 
57. Watson would have had no trouble maintaining an action against the insured in Loui-
siana, at least under today's standards. Equipped with a judgment, Watson would have had 
no difficulty in enforcing against the insurance company in Louisiana, by way of garnishment 
or its equivalent, with jurisdiction based upon the company's transaction of unrelated business 
in Louisiana. Shajfer v. Heitner does not require minimum contacts for the enforcement of a 
valid judgment. 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977). 
58. Juries may typically assume that the defendant is insured whether or not insurance is 
mentioned. Moreover, in the Watson case, the tortfeasor, the Gillette Company, was so obvi• 
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and the like. On the whole, even though the issue may be important 
to the insurance company, it seems legitimately categorizable as 
"procedural" and thus not subject to any ordinary choice-of-law re-
strictions. The minimum contacts approach, with the procedure ex-
ception to legislative jurisdiction, would therefore produce the same 
result as the Court's opinion: the Louisiana direct action law applies 
in Watson. 
It is possible, though considerably more difficult, to reconcile the 
result in Clay with a minimum contacts standard for legislative juris-
diction. In Clay, the issue was whether or not Florida could apply its 
statute outlawing contractual clauses that limited the plaintiffs time 
for bringing suit to a period of less than five years. The plaintiffs 
claim was under an insurance contract covering the loss of personal 
property. The insurance had been purchased with a lump-sum pay-
ment in Illinois. 59 A contract provision, valid under Illinois law, 
limited suit to one year after loss. The insured thereafter moved to 
Florida where the loss occurred. More than a year after the loss, the 
plaintiff brought suit in Florida. Florida obtained jurisdiction over 
the insurance company because it conducted unrelated business in 
the state. Florida applied its statute to void the contractual limita-
tion, and the United States Supreme Court aflirmed.60 
Although it is at best tenuous to claim there were minimum con-
tacts between the defendant and the forum in Clay,61 a court that 
wanted to preserve the decision in Clay while adopting a minimum 
contacts approach to legislative jurisdiction might argue that the 
Florida statute was "procedural" for choice-of-law purposes.62 A 
state should be able to label an issue "procedural" and apply its own 
law to that issue as long as that label appears reasonable. Reason-
able persons could differ as to whether the Florida law at issue in 
Clay satisfies that standard. The typical "substantive" rule in a 
choice-of-law case will either create liability or destroy it. The Flor-
ously itself a "deep pocket" that the notion of bias from the jury's knowledge of insurance is 
simply untenable. 
59. The Supreme Court's opinion does not mention that the payment was lump sum, but 
the first-round Court of Appeals decision does. Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522, 524 
(5th Cir. 1959), vacated, 363 U.S. 207 (1960). 
60. 377 U.S. 179 (1964). 
61. The insurance clause of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, 
quoted in the text at note 56 supra, would not by its own terms apply to the case since the risk 
was not present in the state of Florida at the time of contracting. 
62. I have argued elsewhere, however, that a state without contacts with a case should be 
constitutionally barred from applying its own statute of limitations if the effect is to allow an 
action that would be barred under the statutes of those states having contacts with the case. 
Martin, Statutes of Limitations and Rationality in the Co,iflict of Laws, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 405 
(1980). 
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ida statute might be viewed as procedural because the time extension 
it requires merely extends preexisting liability. 63 At a minimum it 
can be said that the Florida statute lies on the border-line of sub-
stance and procedure, far from the core of substantive rights that 
ought to be preserved in any system of constitutional limitations on 
choice of law. On this basis, the result in Clay is consistent with a 
minimum contacts standard for legislative jurisdiction accompanied 
by the procedure exception.64 
Unlike the result in Watson and Clay, a minimum contacts stan-
dard would require rejection of the forum state's law in Hague v. 
Allstate Insurance Co. 65 In Hague, the plaintiffs husband had been 
killed in a motorcycle accident in Wisconsin, near the Minnesota 
border. At the time, the decedent was a resident of Wisconsin as was 
his wife, the plaintiff. Decedent Hague worked across the border in 
Minnesota although he lived in Wisconsin. The motorcycle, oper-
ated by the decedent's son, was registered in Wisconsin. The auto-
mobile with which the motorcycle collided was driven by a resident 
of Wisconsin. The driver of the automobile was uninsured. The 
Hagues owned three automobiles, each of which was separately in-
sured with the defendant Allstate. Each auto carried uninsured mo-
torist coverage to a limit of $15,000. After the accident but before 
suit was brought, the plaintiff moved to Minnesota for reasons unre-
lated to the suit, and then sued Allstate for $45,000 in a Minnesota 
63. This fact would clearly not make the issue procedural for Erie purposes, Guaranty 
Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), but as indicated in note 52 supra, the 
standards for what is procedural and what is substantive differ for Erie and choice-of-law 
cases. The Supreme Court has also asserted that a state may apply its own statute of limita-
tions, even though the statute would allow an action barred by the statute of the state whose 
substantive law controls and even though the forum has no basis for applying its own "sub-
stantive law," on the apparent reasoning that the statute of limitations may be considered 
procedural for choice-of-law purposes. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 517 
(1953). 
64. The proposed rationale for upholding Clay would also support overruling JJick be-
cause the issue in JJick was similar. That result is acceptable if it is understood that the gen-
eral proposition laid down in JJick is still valid, but inapplicable to the limitations issue 
actually involved in that case for reasons stated in the text. The fact that the loss occurred 
within the forum in Clay but not in JJick is a tempting distinction but would still not seem to 
provide minimum contacts with the insurer in Clay. 
One could also argue that Clay involved a waiver of the minimum contacts requirement by 
the defendant. The Court in Clay emphasized that by its own terms the insurance contract 
covered loss of the property anywhere in the world. Moreover, the contract did not attempt to 
make the law oflllinois (where the contract was entered) applicable in actions brought outside 
Illinois. The Court's emphasis on these two points makes it look almost as if the Court viewed 
the contract as consenting to the application of the law of other states. Obviously as a constitu-
tional matter a defendant may consent to the application of a state's law even if it otherwise 
has insufficient contacts under any test to uphold application of that law. Cf. The Bremen v. 
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (upholding forum-selection contract clause although 
the selected forum had no interest in or contact with the controversy). 
65. - Minn. -, 289 N.W.2d 43 (1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980). 
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court. Jurisdiction over the insurance company in Minnesota was 
based upon business transacted by the company in Minnesota unre-
lated to the claim. Under Wisconsin law, the plaintiff would proba-
bly not have been allowed to "stack" the $15,000 of uninsured 
motorist coverage on the three automobiles to obtain $45,000. 
Under the Minnesota law she would. Minnesota applied its own law 
to the case despite constitutional objections by the insurance com-
pany. The majority opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court only 
cursorily discussed the constitutional issue involved. 66 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari. 67 
Hague should be reversed under the proposed minimum contacts 
approach to legislative jurisdiction. Applying the minimum contacts 
approach, it seems clear that Minnesota could not have asserted ju-
risdiction over Allstate absent the company's unrelated business ac-
tivities in the state. (It should be noted that the minimum contacts 
standard assures that a plaintiff's fortuitous post-liability, prelitiga-
tion move to the forum will not allow choice of the forum's substan-
tive law since the plaintiff's residence is not part of the minimnm 
contacts analysis.) Nor can Hague be rationalized under a proce-
dure exception. The law at issue in Hague, unlike the Florida law in 
Clay, is clearly substantive - while the effect of the law in Clay was 
merely to prolong preexisting liability, the effect of the law in Hague 
is to triple preexisting liability. 
Hague should be reversed even if the present case law is not sup-
plemented by a new minimum contacts standard. Home Insurance 
Co. v . .Dick68 established that the plaintiff's domicile, standing alone, 
could not support application of the forum's law. Although there are 
some similarities between Hague and Clay, one important difference 
requires that Hague be reversed: the loss took place within the fo-
rum in Clay and outside the forum in Hague. The majority in 
Hague noted that the decedent worked in Minnesota, and that the 
insurer therefore knew that it was insuring against losses in Minne-
sota to which Minnesota law might be applied, but the fact remains 
that tI?-e accident actually took place in Wisconsin, that Minnesota 
therefore lacked any meaningful contact with the case, and that Wis-
consin substantive law must therefore apply where it conflicts with 
that of Minnesota. By analogy, the fact that an airplane accident 
may take place anywhere within several hundred miles of the sched-
uled route, and that the airline will be subject to the laws of the place 
66. - Minn. at -, 289 N.W.2d at 48-49. 
67. 100 S. Ct. at 1012. 
68. 281 U.S. 397 (1930). 
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of the accident wherever it occurs, has never given nearby states 
carte blanche to apply their own laws in favor of the survivors of 
their residents. 
The present case law, like the proposed minimum contacts ap-
proach to legislative jurisdiction, requires reversal in Hague. Thus, 
though Hague will provide an opportunity for a fresh look at consti-
tutional limitations on choice of law, it will, unfortunately, merely 
invite, rather than demand, a choice between a coherent minimum 
contacts theory and the confused theory of the past. 
